Abstract-Client-to-Client Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (C2C-PAKE) protocols allow two clients establish a common session key based on their passwords. In a secure C2C-PAKE protocol, there is no computationally bounded adversary learns anything about session keys shared between two clients. Especially a participating server should not learn anything about session keys. Server-compromise impersonation resilience is another desirable security property for a C2C-PAKE protocol. It means that compromising the password verifier of any client A should not enable outside adversary to share session key with A. Recently, Kwon and Lee proposed four C2C-PAKE protocols in the three-party setting, and Zhu et al. proposed a C2C-PAKE protocol in the cross-realm setting. All the proposed protocols are claimed to resist server compromise. However, in this paper, we show that Kwon and Lee's protocols and Zhu et al's protocol exist server compromise attacks, and a malicious server can mount man-in-themiddle attacks and can eavesdrop the communication between the two clients.
I. INTRODUCTION
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) enables two communication entities to authenticate each other and establish a session key via easily memorable passwords. In 1992, Bellovin and Merritt [1] proposed a two-party encrypted key exchange protocol based on passwords. Since then, many two-party passwordauthenticated key exchange (2PAKE) protocols have been proposed. 2PAKE protocols are quite suitable for the clientserver architecture. However, in large-scale client-client communication environments where a user wants to communicate with many other users, 2PAKE protocol is very inconvenient in key management that the user would need to remember large number of passwords. Gong, Lomas, Needham, and Saltzer [2] proposed a three-party password-based key transfer protocol using server's public key. Later, Steiner, Tsudik and Waider [3] proposed a three-party client-to-client PAKE (C2C-PAKE) protocol between two clients without server's public key. The C2C-PAKE protocol is different from the 2PAKE protocol in the fact that the server is assumed besides two communicating clients. Both communicating clients should share respective passwords with the server rather than themselves.
To provide a cross-realm authentication, where clients from one environment (realm) wish to communicate with clients from other realms, Byun et al. [4] presented a fourparty C2C-PAKE protocol in the cross-realm setting where two clients are in two different realms and hence two servers involved. The goal of their protocol is that these two clients can establish a common session key based on their passwords shared respectively with two servers.
It is desirable for C2C-PAKA protocols to possess the following security properties:
Key secrecy: There is no computationally bounded adversary learns anything about session keys shared between two honest clients. Especially a participating server should not learn anything about session keys shared between two honest clients [5] . In the cross-realm setting, even the two servers in two different realms sharing information with each other should not learn anything about session keys.
Server-compromise impersonation resilience: Compromising the password verifier of any client A should not enable outside adversary to share session key with A. There are two type server-compromise impersonation attacks in a C2C -PAKE protocol: (1) . An adversary who steals the verifier of client A from the server can impersonate any other clients to communicate with A without performing dictionary attacks on the verifier of A. (2) . An adversary who steals the verifier of client A from the server can impersonate client A to communicate with any other clients without performing dictionary attacks on the verifier of A.
Forward secrecy: If the passwords of some clients are compromised, the secrecy of previously established session keys should not be compromised.
Unknown key-share resilience: Client A should not be able to coerce into sharing a key with any client C when in fact he thinks that he is sharing the key with client B.
Off-line dictionary attack resilience: There is no successful adversary as follows: The adversary intercepts communication messages during a protocol execution and stores them locally, and then finds out the password offline by verifying all candidate passwords via the captured information. In the cross-realm setting, one malicious server should not mount an off-line dictionary attack to obtain the password of a client who belongs to the other realm.
Undetectable on-line dictionary attack resilience: There is no successful adversary as follows: The adversary attempted to use a guessed password in an online transaction without being detected. He verified the correctness of his guess by using the response from server. If his guess failed, he starts a new transaction with server using another guessed password. A failed guess can not be logged. That is, a failed guess is never detected by the server and the client, and the adversary can legally and undetectably check the guessed password.
No key control: The secret session key between any two clients is determined by both users taking part in, and none of the two clients can influence the outcome of the secret session key, or enforce the session key to fall into a pre-determined interval.
In [5] , Kwon and Lee studied password authenticated key agreement in the three-party setting and proposed four C2C-PAKE protocols, where the client holds password and the server holds the password verifier. They claimed that their three-party password authenticated key agreement protocols are resistant to server compromise and even the trusted third party could not be able to access the agreed key.
In [6] , Kim et al. showed that Byun et al.'s C2C-PAKE protocol [4] is vulnerable to a Denning-Sacco-style attack where the adversary is an insider with knowledge of the password of a client in a different realm. Kim et al. also proposed an improved C2C-PAKE protocol. Yoon and Yoo [7] demonstrated that Kim et al.'s C2C-PAKE protocol is vulnerable to one-way man-in-the-middle attack and password-compromise impersonation attack. Yoon and Yoo also presented an enhancement to resolve these problems. In [8] , Cao showed that Yoon and Yoo's protocol is vulnerable to server-compromise impersonation attacks. In [9] , Xu proved that it is impossible to resist server-compromise attack for designing cross-realm C2C-PAKA protocols based sharing-password between client and server. Recently, Zhu et al. proposed a new C2C-PAKE protocol [10] , where the client holds password and the server holds the password verifier.
In this paper, we find that Kwon and Lee's protocols and Zhu et al.'s protocol are still vulnerable to servercompromise impersonation attacks and a malicious server can eavesdrop the communication between the two clients.
II. CRYPTANALYSIS OF KWON AND LEE'S C2C -PAKE PROTOCOLS

A. Description of Kwon and Lee's Protocols
In [5] , Kwon and Lee proposed four C2C-PAKE protocols. The conceptual flows of the proposed protocol are depicted in Fig. 1 . In Fig. 1, A Let κ be a general security parameter (say 160 bits) and l be a special security parameter for public keys (1024 or 2048 bits). A, B, and S should agree on the algebraic parameters related to Diffie-Hellman key agreement such as p, q, and g. As for the prime p = rq+1, p and q are secure primes. Let g be a generator of order q in Z p * and G q be the group generated by g. Let us omit 'mod p' from the expressions that are obvious in Z p *.We assume h(·), f(·), k(·), and kdf(·) mean strong one-way hash functions having κ-bit output. For distinguishing the functionality, we denote them by each different name and also we define h i , f i , and k i where Let us follow the message flows for A in Fig. 1 and abbreviate those of B since B may perform similar steps.
In the first step, A sends message 1 to S by computing Once client B's password verifier has stolen by the adversary Malice. Malice can also impersonate client A to communicate with B by performing the similar steps.
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IV. CONCLUSION Client-to-Client
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (C2C-PAKE) protocols allow two clients establish a common session key based on their passwords. Such protocols are attractive for their simplicity and convenience and have received much interest in the research community. Recently, Kwon and Lee proposed four C2C-PAKE protocols in the threeparty setting, and Zhu et al. proposed a C2C-PAKE protocol in the cross-realm setting. All the proposed protocols are claimed to resist server compromise. However, in this paper, we have shown that Kwon and Lee's protocols and Zhu et al's protocol exist server compromise attacks, and a malicious server can mount man-in-the-middle attacks and can eavesdrop the communication between the two clients. Now, how to design a C2C-PAKE protocols that resist against all known attacks without requiring any server's public key is still an open problem.
